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Economic expansion is not an end in itself. Its first aim should be to enable disparities in 
living conditions to be reduced. It must take place with the participation of all the social 
partners. It should result in an improvement in the quality of life as well as in standards 
of living. [P]articular attention will be given to intangible values and to protecting the 
environment, so that progress may really be put at the service of mankind.
(Statement from the Paris Summit, 19–21 October 1972) 
(Bulletin of the European Communities, October 1972, No. 10)
Introduction
With this bold statement, the heads of the then 12 member states formally instigated 
a process of developing a common EU-wide environmental policy. Although some 
minor environmentally related items of policy were already on the EU’s statute book 
in 1972, most environmental policies in Europe had until then been developed by 
states acting independently in their own distinctive national settings. While extensive 
and wide-ranging, these national policies did not fully address the increasingly trans-
boundary nature of many environmental problems. The Paris meeting aimed to pro-
mote more coordinated environmental action. Shortly afterwards, the Commission 
began to steer the EU towards the European Council’s vision of a more sustainable 
Europe – one that still seems remarkably visionary today, some 50 years later.
In 1972, other supranational bodies such as the OECD and UN were also embarking 
on similar journeys. But since then, the EU has moved further and faster than they 
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Summary guide
Over the last 50 years, environmental protection has emerged as one of the 
front-ranking objectives of the EU. Today, the EU has some of the world’s most 
ambitious and comprehensive protection policies. This chapter begins by summa-
rising the main characteristics of EU environmental policy. Second, it reflects on 
the challenges that the advocates of EU action overcame to build such a significant 
environmental role. It then analyses how and why the focus of policy making in re-
cent decades has shifted away from securing the EU’s legal authority to act, to more 
managerial priorities such as ensuring that existing policy is fully implemented and 
insightfully updated. Finally, it looks forward and identifies what is likely to chal-
lenge policy makers in the coming decades as the EU attempts to implement its bold 
Green Deal policies in the aftermath of the COVID-19 global pandemic.
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have towards a pattern of deep and enduring policy coordination. Today, environmen-
tal policy is a front-ranking political objective of the EU. It is also a relatively mature 
area of EU activity, which is ‘broad in scope, extensive in detail and often stringent in 
effect’ (Weale et al., 2000: 1). In many sub-areas of policy, which touch upon all levels 
of governance from the international right down to the street level, the EU is an advo-
cate of high environmental standards. According to the EEA, they constitute ‘the most 
comprehensive set of environmental standards in the world’ (EEA, 2019: 61).
The chapters of this book have charted the EU’s environmental ‘journey to centre 
stage’ (Haigh, 2016), pinpointing the key actors, institutions and processes of environ-
mental policy making. The key actors include DG Environment, the Environment Com-
mittee of the European Parliament and the EEA, around whom orbit a number of other 
actors, including interest groups, scientific organisations and governmental bodies. The 
main institutions are both legal – chiefly the founding treaties and the main items of en-
vironmental law and policy – and procedural. Finally, new processes of policy making 
have been established which allow the EU to absorb political demands for collective 
action and fashion them first of all into policy outputs (laws, rules and policies) and, 
eventually, environmental improvements on the ground in the 27 member states.
The main aims of this concluding chapter are threefold. First of all, it summarises 
the main characteristics of EU environmental policy, emphasising those which most 
strongly distinguish it from international and national policy. Second, it characterises 
the EU as a complex, multi-levelled environmental governance system and identifies 
key challenges that advocates of greater EU action had to overcome since 1972. It 
reveals how and why their focus has shifted on from securing the EU’s political and 
legal authority to act, to more managerial priorities such as ensuring that policy is 
fully implemented and insightfully evaluated. Third, it considers if EU environmental 
policy is now a system in equilibrium. Finally, it looks forward and identifies future 
challenges, including implementing the EU’s bold European Green Deal in the after-
math of the global COVID-19 pandemic.
The main characteristics of EU policy
Over the last 50 years, environmental protection has been transformed from a rather 
discrete, ‘niche’ activity (Lenschow, 2020: 297) to a significant and wide-ranging pol-
icy sector in its own right, with distinctive actors, institutions and policy processes. 
Summary points
• EU environment policy formally commenced at a meeting of heads of state 
in 1972.
• Over the next 50 years, the EU made far greater strides in developing coor-
dinated protection policies than other broadly comparable supranational 
organisations such as the OECD and the UN.
• This chapter summarises the main characteristics of EU policy, outlines the 
challenges that the EU had to overcome to develop a role in the environmental 
sector and explores some of the challenges that may emerge in coming decades.
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As it developed and matured, EU environmental policy has assumed certain defining 
characteristics, that differentiate it from policies developed at national and interna-
tional levels. Without wishing to be exhaustive or to over-state the uniqueness of EU 
policy, the chapters of this book have revealed that it is:
• Broad in its aims and focus: its four overarching objectives are very succinctly 
stated in the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU, Article 19) (see Box 1.3). The focus of its pro-
tection activities is correspondingly wide-ranging, encompassing very specific 
sub-sectoral concerns such as waste, air and water pollution, through to those that 
impinge heavily on cognate sectors such as genetic modification, biofuels, carbon 
capture and storage and access to environmental information. In that respect, the 
cross-sectoral reach of EU environmental policy is little different to most national 
policies in the industrialised world.
• Actively informed by (and has been engineered to give substantial effect to) a set 
of overarching policy principles: these principles, which include the polluter pays, 
prevention and policy integration, are also well-established in UN law. But the EU 
has given them quasi-constitutional status, through enshrining them in its found-
ing treaties (Benson et al., 2019), and used them to build seven comprehensive 
action programmes and many hundreds of items of law and policy. In fact, some 
of the principles have become almost synonymous with the EU. They include ‘pre-
caution’, ‘subsidiarity’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘environmental policy integration’. In 
a sense, they are the EU’s ‘specialisms’ (Chapter 12) that embody its particular 
philosophy of environmental protection.
• Relatively ad hoc in nature: in spite of its breadth, scale and scope, EU policy is 
largely the product of ‘political action but not of political design’ (Weale et al., 
2000: 488). It is an intricately embroidered ‘policy patchwork’ (Chapter 4) that 
emerged incrementally over time, rather than in response to a master plan drawn 
up in Brussels. Where problems spanned political borders or involved a clear trade 
dimension, the value added of EU involvement was more obvious and common 
policies were adopted relatively quickly. But many issues, which are now actively 
governed by the EU, have never exhibited a strong trade dimension: zoos, bathing 
and drinking water quality, waste water treatment, nature protection and renew-
able energy supplies for example. This feature has long puzzled scholars as other 
supranational organisations such as the UN do not ordinarily involve themselves 
in directly governing such local matters.
• Mainly regulatory in nature: despite many attempts to engage in policy instrument 
‘innovation’ (Chapter 4), the EU still operates mainly as a ‘regulatory state’. The 
lack of a legal base in the treaties supporting fiscal measures has certainly helped 
to retard the use of environmental taxes, as has political resistance from vested 
interests. Voluntary agreements have been trialled but not extensively employed 
at EU level. Nevertheless, the EU still has many more policy instruments in its 
toolbox than other international organisations.
• Ambitious with respect to both its scope and its effect: one of the most fundamen-
tal weaknesses of international policy is that it struggles to rise above the lowest 
common denominator of state preferences. But over the last 50 years, the EU has 
sought to go well above and beyond the lowest common denominator of member 
state preferences (see Chapters 4 and 11) and adopt policies that ‘aim at a high level 
of protection’. In fact, this aim is enshrined as a treaty objective (TFEU, Article 
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191 (2)). The EU has done so for various reasons, including the entrepreneurial 
activities of actors such as the Commission and the Parliament, expansive rulings 
by the CJEU and the campaigning activities of environmental interest groups.
• A powerful determinant of national policy and politics within Europe: the first few 
items of EU policy may have landed on ‘virgin ground’ in the member states (see 
Chapter 7), but nowadays, almost all new policy development in Europe is de-
termined in or involves the EU (Börzel and Buzogány, 2019). It is impossible to 
understand the environmental policy of any of the member states without un-
derstanding EU policy (Haigh, 2000), as the two have become inextricably inter-
twined. Europeanisation is the process through which EU-level policies affect and 
transform domestic policy and political systems. Scholars have shown that every 
member state has been deeply Europeanised by the EU since 1972, even the so-
called environmental leader states (Chapter 5) that originally encouraged the EU to 
adopt high standards. In states with less well-developed environmental policies, the 
combined EU effect since 1972 has been even greater (Jordan and Liefferink, 2004). 
Crucially, EU policy creates a set of minimum standards which member states of all 
levels of ambition and internal capacity find difficult to regress from when, as often 
happens, political and economic conditions change (see Chapter 19). Finally, the EU 
does not simply Europeanise policy objectives and standards: it also disseminates 
policy processes such as impact assessment and ex post evaluation (Chapter 14), as 
well as, via its agencies such as EEA, the basic raw materials of policy development: 
scientific knowledge, monitoring data and best practices (Chapter 6).
• Remains flexible enough to allow member states to maintain some distinctive na-
tional approaches: while core aspects of national policy have become more similar 
through their interaction with EU policy, there has been no long-term convergence 
towards a standard ‘EU-inspired’ model or policy blueprint. The 27 member states 
routinely ‘customise’ EU policy requirements (Chapter 13) in noticeably different 
ways, but not to an extent that hinders trade. Despite what some Eurosceptics may 
think, ‘Brussels’ is not all powerful – there is a basic and fundamental ‘diversity in 
unity’ (see Chapter 4), which is facilitated by the widespread use of a specific type 
of policy instruments know as a directive, which dictate the ends to be achieved 
rather than the precise means of policy. Maintaining or adopting more stringent 
national measures remains possible in some cases (see TFEU, Article 193).
• Affects standards in other parts of the world: the EU is an international actor in its 
own right and a party to around 60 international environmental agreements – a 
right which was ‘hard won’ (see Chapter 15). Even today, the EU has no formal 
voting rights in the UN. International environmental diplomacy is, moreover, only 
one of several ways in which the EU seeks to give effect to its Treaty-based com-
mitment (TFEU Article 193 (1) to address international environmental issues). Al-
though its international ambitions have regularly overstretched its policy delivery 
capabilities (Adelle et al., 2018: 356) and there have been ‘major disappointments’ 
along the way (see Chapter 15), the EU has learnt to deploy a wide array of dif-
ferent levers, such as its ‘market power’ (Damro, 2012), to push other parts of the 
world to align with its preferred environmental standards – giving effect to what 
is sometimes known as the ‘Brussels effect’ (Bradford, 2020) (see also Chapter 3). 
On occasions, its efforts have triggered political disputes with some of its trad-
ing partners such as the US (in relation to plans to include international aviation 
in the EU ETS) and Canada (which objected to the EU’s policies on tar sands) 
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(see Chapter 9). Soft and market power have also been repeatedly deployed much 
closer to home to influence environmental practices in aspiring member states via 
the formal mechanism of EU enlargement (Pollack et al., 2015: 477).
• Are nevertheless heavily influenced by international policy processes. For example, 
Chapter 16 noted that the conclusions of the 1972 Paris summit (quoted above) 
were a response to the world’s first UN environmental conference held in Stock-
holm in June 1972. Similarly, the EU landmark ETS – the world’s largest emissions 
trading system – would not have been created had the EU not previously signed 
up to an international (Kyoto) protocol in 1997 (Chapter 17). International and 
EU policies are in other words ‘mutually constitutive’ (Chapter 15). Aware of the 
potential political potency of this, the Commission has repeatedly sought out in-
ternational agreements on matters such as the SDGs, in the hope that they would 
also boomerang back into the EU and foster political pressure for more ambitious 
internal policies (Jordan and Moore, 2020).
• Has been relatively effective: EU policy has delivered many important policy suc-
cesses. But the EEA’s most recent five yearly state of the environment report began 
by emphasising that the EU must nonetheless confront environmental problems of 
‘unprecedented scale and urgency’ (EEA, 2019: 9). Time and time again, the scale 
and speed of human development has overtaken the EU’s policy achievements (see 
also Selin and Van Deveer, 2015: 310). What is or is not done in the next ten years 
will be of ‘decisive importance’ if the EU wishes to implement the vision that lies 
at the heart of its Green Deal (EEA, 2019: 9).
• Relatively popular with EU citizens: unlike some other policy areas, the basic ra-
tionale for EU involvement in environmental protection is widely understood and 
appreciated by the public. Eurobarometer polls regularly attest to the relatively 
high levels of support for EU-level action (Eurobarometer, 2017), particularly on 
issues related to climate change (Eurobarometer, 2019). Although the public’s sup-
port is not unconditional – on which more below – it nonetheless represents a 
significant and somewhat surprising achievement, given the relative remoteness of 
Brussels from national politics and the relatively limited effect that public opinion 
has in shaping EU policy agendas (see Chapter 10).
Summary points
• As it matured, EU policy assumed a number of unique characteristics, 
which differentiate it from international and state policy.
• These characteristics include policy that is: broad in focus; informed by 
guiding principles; mainly regulatory; and ambitious in scope and effect.
• Nowadays, EU policy is a powerful determinant of national policy and 
politics within Europe, but flexible enough to allow differences in national 
approach.
• Although less fully accomplished than its internally focused policies, the 
EU also has significant ambitions (and policies) to influence environmental 
quality outside Europe.
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Environmental policy at 50: a stocktake
The EU as a system of multi-level governance
Having summarised the main characteristics of EU environmental policy, what about 
the wider political system in which it is embedded? As noted above, the EU does not 
fit easily into the conventional categories used by policy analysts, being neither a sov-
ereign state nor a relatively toothless international organisation. Today, there are still 
the same basic levels of governance that existed in 1972 (i.e., international, national 
and sub-national), but the EU now constitutes a distinct level of governance in its own 
right. Moreover, at this new level, there are actors present that did not even exist in 
1972. It may not always mean a great deal to those living outside the Brussels ‘bubble’, 
but it is politically significant that the environment has its own designated ministerial 
forum – the Environment Council (see Chapter 5). The European Parliament too has 
its own committee dealing with environmental affairs, and the EU has an agency – the 
EEA – based in Copenhagen, whose main task it is to collect and disseminate environ-
mental knowledge. It is immensely important in politics to have strong institutional 
anchor points such as these, when national policy agendas are in constant flux (see 
Chapter 10). In addition to these anchor points, there are many other actors who, while 
being attentive to EU-level activities, principally operate at a national level (e.g., na-
tional ministries and agencies, national parliaments and political parties). Finally, the 
chapters of this book have also identified another set of actors that moves seamlessly 
between all the levels (environmental lobby groups and national civil servants, for 
example, as well as internationally oriented businesses and lobbyists, see Chapter 9).
If the EU is not a state or an international organisation, what kind of political system 
is it? The term that is often used to describe it is a system of ‘multi-level governance’. As 
Börzel (2010: 191) and others have helpfully pointed out, the EU has hierarchical powers, 
including the ability to fine member states and withdraw their voting rights, but generally 
chooses not to use them. In other words, the governance of the EU operates in the ‘shadow 
of hierarchy’ (Börzel, 2010: 209). Green political theorists have long debated the form that 
the modern state should adapt to be environmentally optimal (Dobson, 2000). Many be-
lieve that states are too big and ponderous to deal with local matters, but too small and 
puny to deal with problems that span borders. Some maintain that in the EU, Europe has 
gradually settled on the best combination of both forms – the ‘closest  real-world approxi-
mation’ that we have to a genuinely ‘green state’ (Eckersley, 2004: 251).
The ‘process of becoming’: challenges overcome
In Chapter 1, we noted that the EU has always been a work in progress – a ‘process 
of becoming’ (Laffan et al., 2000: 193). One point which emerges from the chapters in 
Part I is that over the last 50 years, this process has often been against the odds. First 
of all, EU policy originally lacked an uncontested basis in the Treaty of Rome (see 
Chapters 2 and 4 for further detail). This forced the Commission to rely on an ad hoc 
strategy of purposeful opportunism, i.e., focusing on the mundane technical task of 
how to harmonise standards in an emerging single market, rather than grand policy 
planning. Fifty years on, lawyers would prefer the acquis to be more neatly and logi-
cally organised around a set of clear underlying legal principles (Lee, 2014). But some 
messiness was arguably inevitable, given the Commission’s necessarily incremental 
working strategy. Although things eventually changed in the 1980s, environmental 
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protection still does not enjoy the same status in the treaties as that of free trade 
(Chapter 7). When the two have conflicted, the latter has generally been treated as the 
overriding priority. Crucially, EU policies which restrict trade are ‘always very care-
fully defined and bounded’ (Sbragia, 2000: 223).
The second challenge was how to overcome the need for unanimous agreement in 
the Council (Deters, 2018: 317). This may not sound particularly important, but it is 
something that continues to hold back other supranational bodies such as the UN. 
The Commission responded by pushing for European ‘integration by stealth’ (Majone, 
2009) – i.e., focusing on the detailed technical content of new legislative proposals 
whilst at the same time pushing for treaty changes, which eventually introduced more 
majority voting (see Chapter 1 for details) (Zito et al., 2019: 187). It is a measure of how 
far this process of constitutionalisation had progressed by the 2000s that the most 
recent amendment – the 2009 Lisbon Treaty – had relatively limited effect on most 
aspects of EU environmental policy making (but see Chapter 15). It is telling that this 
edition of the book is the first not to include a chapter dedicated to explaining the ef-
fects of recent treaty changes. Nevertheless, there are still some important sub-areas of 
environmental policy where the EU’s role is not completely accepted – and hence the 
Council operates on the basis of unanimous voting. These include land use planning, 
green taxation and the selection of energy supplies.
Third, there has never really been a strong, EU-wide party–political coalition push-
ing for stricter environmental policies (Chapter 4). The Greens have been the most 
consistent champions and have enjoyed repeated electoral success in Northern states 
and of course in the Parliament itself (Chapter 8). But even today, they have very little 
presence in the southern and the eastern parts of the EU (in the 2019 Parliamentary 
elections, not a single Green MEP won a seat in the ‘EU 12’ or Italy). Many EU policies 
have, however, imposed significant adaptation costs on some member states as well 
as powerful actors such as businesses (Chapter 9). Policies that do this tend to foster 
political opposition against themselves, eventually slowing down or halting new policy 
adoption. But by acting stealthily and employing consensus-forming strategies (e.g., 
delaying the imposition of costs into the future, using side payments and engaging in 
package dealing – see Chapter 10), pro-environmental actors have been able to expand 
the stock and scope of EU environmental policy measures. In fact, many actors that 
initially opposed EU action – the water, waste and energy supply industries to name 
just three – eventually benefited massively from the greater investor confidence that 
EU policies provided, and now actively support greater EU action. In other words, 
strong policies have, through time, created new political dynamics supporting a higher 
level of protection. In the policy sciences, this phenomenon is known as policy feed-
back (Jordan and Moore, 2020).
Fourth, the EU has always had – and in all probability will continue to have – a 
strongly ‘economic bias’ (Chapter 2), focusing strongly on the removal of barriers to 
trade (see Chapters 9–11). Even after 50 years of steady policy expansion, EU environ-
mental policy makers still enjoy much weaker enforcement powers than those working 
in the trade and competition sectors (see Chapter 7). At a general level, policy theory – 
and specifically Anthony Downs’ account of political agenda setting (see Chapter 19) – 
suggests that economic factors repeatedly disrupt and retard policy expansion. How-
ever, pro-environmental actors have nonetheless managed to invent strategies to spot 
and exploit synergies between environmental protection and the pursuit of economic 
growth – such as via the ideological framings of ecological modernisation and ‘green 
growth’ (Chapters 9 and 16). As Chapter 10 made clear, framing a new policy proposal 
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in such terms has become a tried and tested agenda-setting tactic within Brussels. 
For example, in 2011, DG Environment (2011) produced a consultancy report that 
sought to calculate the net social costs of not implementing EU environmental rules. 
But other areas of EU action, such as biodiversity protection or access to information, 
have found it harder to reframe their ideas in more politically tractable ways, hence the 
emerging debate about the bio-economy and ecosystem services (Chapter 16).
Starting in 2004, the EU was confronted by two further challenges which together 
forced a more fundamental reappraisal of both the means and the ends of policy. First of 
all, the number of member states began to change quite significantly. The EU has repeat-
edly expanded in the past 50 years, from just 6 states in 1957 to 27 in 2020, although mostly 
for ‘non-environmental’ reasons. Each new wave of entrants increased the economic, so-
cial and administrative diversity of the EU, but somehow EU environmental policy con-
tinued to march onwards. With regards to the first enlargement (in 1973, when the UK, 
Ireland and Denmark joined), the environment was hardly salient at all (Selin and Van 
Deveer, 2015: 322). The 1981 enlargement (to include Greece, Portugal and Spain) raised 
more significant environmental issues but these did not significantly disrupt the steady 
rhythm of EU environmental policy expansion. And the next (1995) enlargement – 
when the Nordic member states and Austria joined – arguably strengthened the group of 
environmentally progressive states in the Council (see Chapters 2 and 5).
However, the 2004, 2007 and 2013 enlargements were quantitatively and qualita-
tively very different, rapidly increasing the size of the EU (from 15 to 28 member states) 
and significantly altering internal power dynamics (see Chapters 2 and 4). Relatively 
quickly, the EU was transformed from an economically relatively homogenous West 
European club to one that is now truly pan-European, encompassing states at very 
different level of industrial development. Initial fears that such a sudden increase in 
diversity would immediately lead to institutional paralysis were not borne out, how-
ever. Indeed, the associated growth in the EU’s combined ‘market power’ arguably 
strengthened the EU’s hand in international negotiations on the environment, on trade 
and other matters (see Chapter 15).
Nevertheless, the post-2004 enlargements have undoubtedly impacted the internal 
political dynamics of policy making, raising doubts as to whether the traditional and 
mostly informal methods of manufacturing consensus – package dealing, side pay-
ments, fluidity in matters of external representation (see Chapters 10 and 15), etc. – are 
still fit for purpose. In the Council, a new subgroup – the Visegrad Group – formed 
and began to retard the pace and scope of climate and energy policy making. The 
Group’s determination to water down the EU’s 2008 climate energy package was an 
early harbinger of what was to follow (see Chapter 5). In 2019–2020, the Group again 
made its presence felt, delaying the EU’s attempts to adopt a net zero greenhouse gas 
reduction target (by 2050) and complicating the adoption of a new interim reduction 
target for 2030 (the existing target of 40% was adopted before the signing of the Paris 
climate Agreement). However, it is an open question as to whether recent enlargements 
significantly worsened the EU’s overall implementation record; research reported in 
Chapter 13 reveals that the compliance records of the post-2004 member states may be 
as good if not better than the EU-15’s. Nevertheless, whether or not the EU still has, 
in the light of these experiences, the political appetite to absorb more member states, 
e.g., from the Western Balkans, is a very salient question indeed.
Meanwhile, the size of the EU changed again in 2020 when, for the very first time, a 
member state (the UK) departed the EU. Before Brexit, the EU had only ever enlarged. 
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Although the EU only reduced by one state, the UK was an especially large and eco-
nomically powerful one. When the shock result of the EU referendum was announced 
in 2016, it prompted a great deal of fevered speculation that it might embolden other 
states to head towards the exit door, culminating in a gradual unravelling of the whole 
Union. At the time of this writing, this has not happened. Indeed, the EU-27 have 
managed to maintain unity throughout the politically fraught exit negotiations and 
on into the negotiation of a new trading agreement. As Chapters 5 and 19 made clear, 
Brexit will eventually feed through to and influence EU-level policy-making dynamics 
(the UK was an especially consistent advocate of stronger climate policies and better 
regulation-type initiatives). But in the meantime, most of the uncertainty has been 
around the future scope and stringency of UK policy and governance as the country 
attempts to establish a new relationship with the EU and other trading partners.
The second additional challenge was the long period of economic austerity that 
unfolded in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The EU’s willingness to engage in 
international environmental leadership certainly faltered in the wake of the crisis, 
most spectacularly at the Copenhagen Climate Summit. After 2009, the EU struggled 
to agree more ambitious emission reduction targets (Jordan and Moore, 2020), some 
claiming that to do so would encourage large industries to re-locate to states with lower 
standards (‘carbon leakage’). Environmental groups warned that the various bailouts 
provided to indebted member states and business sectors such as car manufacturing 
would help to lock in dirty sources of energy and unsustainable, road-based patterns 
of transport. It is widely accepted that the first new (Juncker) Commission after the 
crisis gave far less political emphasis to environmental issues than its predecessors 
(Burns and Tobin, 2016), prompting fears that environmental policy as a whole would 
not simply stagnate, but go into reverse. During the Juncker Commission, the environ-
ment and fisheries Commission portfolio were merged, major new proposals (on soil 
protection and a circular economy) were withdrawn and fundamental evaluations of 
keystone policies (namely, the nature directives) were announced with an eye towards 
reforming them. And there was a marked decline in the number and stringency of new 
environmental policies adopted after 2008 (Wurzel et al., 2019; Burns et al., 2020). But 
as Chapter 19 made clear, there was no significant dismantling of existing policies.
Summary points
• The EU has constructed a multi-levelled system of environmental govern-
ance which is unique in the world.
• While the EU has access to relatively strong hierarchical powers, they are 
rarely deployed in practice; EU governance generally operates in the shadow 
of hierarchy.
• Over time, EU policy has overcome a number of challenges, including the 
absence of a secure basis in the Treaty of Rome and the need for unanimity 
in the Council.
• After 2004, the EU confronted two additional events which heavily chal-
lenged established dynamics of policy making: persistent economic auster-
ity and repeated alterations in EU membership (including Brexit).
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The EU: an environmental governance system in equilibrium?
Environmental policy enters a new era?
In the period since the publication of the third edition of this book (2013), the EU has 
adopted a number of significant new policies and initiatives, for example:
• On sustainable finance, a detailed ‘taxonomy’ of what constitutes green invest-
ments, as part of a wide package of legislative measures aimed at fostering fi-
nancial sector involvement in and channelling capital towards more sustainable 
economic measures. In time, the EU hopes to use this taxonomy to determine 
‘green labels’ for green bonds and other investment products.
• An extensive package of new climate and energy policy measures to deliver on the 
EU’s 2030 framework. These included revisions to many existing directives on, for 
example, emissions trading and renewable energy (RED II) (Jordan and Moore, 
2020). Interestingly, the new emissions trading directive provides for the creation 
of a new environmental fund (the Modernisation Fund), replenished from the auc-
tion of emission allowances, to support low-carbon energy projects.
• A circular economy action plan to ensure that resources are used more intensively. 
Launched in 2020, it includes proposals for six new directives on waste and a new 
strategy on plastics. One important theme of the plan is to extend existing eco- 
design rules beyond energy performance to cover other aspects such as durability 
and repairability (i.e., to address the throwaway society).
• A high-profile Directive on single use plastics – making it illegal to market plastic cut-
lery and expanded polystyrene cups (see Box 10.1) – and a Regulation on CO2 emissions 
form lorries. The share of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions from the transport sector 
is projected to rise in the future and this new law is the first time that lorries have been 
subject to binding greenhouse gas emission controls at EU level.
In addition to these, in December 2019, the Commission launched, with great fanfare, 
a European Green Deal that aims to put the EU on a new growth trajectory (COM 
(2019) 640, final). The detailed contents were summarised in Chapters 12 and 16, but 
amongst the most eye-catching elements were a series of what the Commission prom-
ised would be ‘deeply transformative policies’ (COM (2019) 640, final: 4), including:
• A new Climate Law – which will set the EU on a path to become the first climate 
neutral continent in the world, i.e., requiring all emissions to be reduced effec-
tively to zero within 30 years (i.e., 2050).
• A proposal to tighten the existing 2030 emission reduction target to 50% and possibly 
60% to ensure that the EU is firmly on track to be the world’s first climate-neutral 
continent by 2050. By 2021, all relevant existing climate-related policy instruments 
will be reviewed and where necessary revised in light of this challenging new tar-
get (COM (2019) 640, final: 4–5).
• A ‘green oath’ – to ensure that all future policy proposals ‘do no harm’ to the envi-
ronment (COM (2019) 640, final: 19). These new policy proposals will address sig-
nificant ongoing biodiversity loss, promote environmentally friendly farming (‘Farm 
to Fork’) and significantly reduce the use of polluting chemicals.
Finally, the Commission proposed a brand new (eighth) EAP setting out a road map 
for ‘decisive further action in the EU and globally (…) that gives back to the planet 
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more than it takes’ (COM (2020) 652 final: 1). EAPs have often been criticised as more 
aspirational than transformative. But the new programme sets clear targets for the EU 
(covering climate neutrality, the delivery of a just decarbonisation transition and the 
UN SDGs) and, critically, offers new tools to hold the EU accountable for fulfilling 
them. These tools include a new monitoring mechanism and a pledge to comply fully 
with the Aarhus Convention (see Chapter 18), which will make it possible for interest 
groups to challenge EU decisions which have general, not only individual, scope (on 
the crucial issue of legal standing, see Chapter 7).
… or a system in equilibrium?
The European Green Deal was as puzzling as it was impressively presented, because it 
emerged at a time when many observers thought that EU environmental policy had at-
tained a state of political and institutional equilibrium, which befitted a middle-aged 
organisation. If the initial phases of policy making (described in Chapter 2) were dom-
inated by the youthful urge to build institutions, occupy new policy niches and es-
tablish a legal toehold, the ‘high period of EU environmental policy ambition [was] 
over’ by the mid to later 2010s (Burns et al., 2019: 3). In the third edition, we already 
noted the marked reduction in the output of new legislation after 2004; those policies 
that were adopted tended to incorporate greater flexibility, allowing member states to 
integrate at different speeds (Deters, 2018: 321). Suddenly, the salient political issues 
were not whether the EU should be involved, but more procedural ones such as how 
it should act, with whom and for what purpose (see also Chapters 10 and 19). Matters 
such as openness, transparency, policy coordination, policy implementation and ex 
post evaluation have long concerned national-level policy makers. Their growing sali-
ence at EU level did not imply an end to environmental politics, but suggested that a 
more managerial kind of politics had gradually taken over.
There were several notable features of the more managerial politics that took 
root in the 2000s and 2010s. They stemmed from a recognition that after decades 
of policy expansion, greater effort probably should be devoted to ensuring that the 
acquis remained up to date. The Commission responded by establishing new pro-
cesses for these purposes – impact assessment, fitness checking and so on – which 
turned out to be every bit as political as the initial phases of EU policy environ-
mental policy.
Second, the more managerial politics took root because several actors had adapted 
their own preferences and strategies to changing external events. For instance, the 
Council arguably became more split, particularly along an East–West axis, with par-
ticular sub-groups emerging and blocking agreement when it did not suit their inter-
ests. The European Council has begun to take a more active interest in environmental 
and particularly climate policy making, reducing the scope for the EU institutions to 
act on their own initiative. The EU institutions are themselves also exercising more 
self-restraint, resulting in shorter, more ‘selective’ bursts of policy activism (Chapter 
19). The Commission is arguably not as entrepreneurial as it once was (Deters, 2018: 
321). It probably realises that it does not always have to be entrepreneurial – its basic 
competence to act has more or less been accepted by the other actors. In fact, recently, 
it offered to share some of its agenda-setting power with the Parliament (Chapter 6). 
Meanwhile, the Parliament also became a more fragmented legislature making it 
harder to build internal coalitions favouring new policy action. It is also using its own 
hard-won powers more selectively (see Chapter 9).
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Understanding and implementing transformative policy change
So, what changed in the late 2010s to facilitate the unexpected emergence of the Green 
Deal? Agenda-setting theories, neatly summarised in Chapter 10, offer some impor-
tant clues. First of all, in 2019, there was a sudden burst of public interest in environ-
mental issues, following a series of high-profile school strikes initiated by the teenage 
activist Greta Thunberg and public marches in many European capitals which were 
attended by many hundreds of thousands of people. Other radical activist groups such 
as Extinction Rebellion began to alter the framing of climate change from highlighting 
the business opportunities to underscoring the fact that they represented an urgent 
almost existential crisis. Other environmental groups extended this framing to issues 
such as biodiversity loss and plastic waste in oceans, using the same crisis-laden termi-
nology. In its 2019 state of the European environment report, the EEA predicted that 
the EU would fall well short in fulfilling the goals identified in the Seventh EAP. In 
spite of progress in some areas, it underlined the need for a suite of new policies that 
generated faster and more transformative change in the underlying systems of food 
production, transport and energy supply (see also Eurostat, 2019).
Second, the EU came under greater pressure to live up to the international commit-
ments to deep decarbonisation that it had entered into at the 2015 Paris conference, 
illustrating yet again the politically potency of the inside-outside dynamic outlined 
above and in Chapter 15. Third, on the back of these developments, the Green po-
litical parties did spectacularly well in the May 2019 European elections, increasing 
their seats by 50%, which for a period, made them the fourth largest political grouping 
in the Parliament. This ‘green wave’ forced Ursula von Leyen to pivot towards envi-
ronmental issues to secure her election as the next Commission President. As part of 
her pitch, she even placed the environment at the top of her list of political priorities 
during her term in office (2019–2024). Once elected – and within the first 100 days – 
her Commission published the European Green Deal outlined above, which made 
repeated references to the need for ‘deeply transformative’ policies (COM (2019) 640, 
final: 4). In fact, on her very first day as President, she told world leaders that the 
Green Deal was ‘Europe’s new growth strategy’ which would not simply set the EU 
on a radical new course, but drive a new wave of economic development that bound 
the whole continent closer together. It was heady and relatively novel stuff – the mere 
idea that a Commission President would make such bold promises would have seemed 
completely far-fetched even a few years earlier. Suddenly, the environment and climate 
change were being presented not just as important aims of EU action, but the most 
important aims towards which all other sectors would align. She likened it to putting 
the first man on the moon (Nicolas, 2019) – immensely challenging, but feasible if there 
was sufficient political will.
The sudden change from managerial to transformational ‘man on the moon’ poli-
tics and policy making certainly poses significant analytical challenges for EU schol-
ars. Over the last 50 years, EU environmental policy has adopted a range of different 
forms. Alongside, the standard legal instruments of policy (Directives, Regulations, 
etc.), there are now myriad secondary laws (delegated acts) (Lee, 2014) as well as 
methods of open coordination such as the NECPs that are less hierarchical than le-
gal harmonisation. Add in the fact that all these policy forms can potentially move 
in a more or less ambitious/stringent direction, and it becomes clear why academics 
are struggling to comprehend the changing scope and ambition level of EU policy. 
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For example, in seeking to determine whether policy is being dismantled, should they 
count the number of policy items or assess their stringency or concentrate on how they 
are being implemented (Chapter 19)? To complicate matters still further, how should 
they assess the effects of environmental policy beyond the EU’s borders – a significant 
policy phenomenon (EEA, 2019) but one that is fiendishly complex to study across 
space and time (Adelle et al., 2018)? It does not help that the EU’s influence is projected 
externally via a mixture of interacting policy mechanisms (development assistance, in-
ternal policies, forms of technical assistance, free trade agreements, etc.), which affect 
different parts of the world at different rates (Kettunen et al., 2020). In short, as the 
scale and reach of EU environmental policy has grown, so has the analytical difficulty 
of describing and explaining it.
Looking to the future: emergent challenges and opportunities
The EU’s apparent determination to embark on a new growth strategy certainly poses 
a number of immediate, practical challenges. This section examines what these are 
likely to be, starting with the most immediate and obvious of all (how will the EU 
achieve what it now wants to do?). Then, it moves on to examine questions of a more 
existential nature (e.g., the EU’s relationship with its citizens and, ultimately, its ulti-
mate purpose in life). Crucially, the newer challenges are themselves layered on the 
existing challenges outlined above – greater internal differentiation, economic auster-
ity, etc.
The first and perhaps most obvious immediate challenge is ensuring that the EU has 
the capacity to deliver on the sweeping policy promises contained in the Green Deal. 
The Commission’s initial Communication pointedly referred to the need to harness 
‘all policy levers’ (COM (2019) 640, final: 4), including entirely new instruments such as 
a carbon border adjustment tax to prevent carbon leakage and meet some of the pro-
jected costs of the EU’s unprecedented, multi-billion Euro COVID-recovery plan (see 
Chapter 6 for details). We have already noted that EU policy is still largely pursued 
via regulatory means. Crucially, when they have been employed, the alternatives have 
not always outperformed regulation (the voluntary agreement on car emissions being 
a good example, see Jordan and Moore, 2020). The EU has also innovated in the way 
that it has adopted new policy-making procedures (Impact Assessment, for example) 
Summary points
• The more managerial politics of the 2000s and 2010s were characterised by 
the discussion of seemingly technical issues such as policy refinement and 
updating.
• By contrast, the Commission presented the European Green Deal as a ‘man 
on the moon’ strategy to shift the EU onto a radically different growth 
trajectory.
• It arose from an unexpected confluence of different factors: more urgent sci-
entific warnings of imminent environmental crises; the rise of new, radical 
action groups; and mounting public concern.
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and/or governance processes to cover issues in which its competence is contested (e.g., 
the use of the Open Method of Coordination in the area of climate change adaptation 
and climate/energy planning).
But does it genuinely have the capacity to transform whole systems of production 
and consumption commensurate with net zero emissions? Regulation will probably 
have an important part to play in the way the EU responds, but its limitations are well 
known and difficult to overcome (Chapter 17). In spite of repeated efforts to address 
the situation, something as apparently straightforward as implementing the existing 
stock of laws and policies stubbornly remains the ‘Achilles’ heel’ of EU policy (Chap-
ter 13), as the EEA and many others have repeatedly pointed out (EEA, 2019: 423). 
The Green Deal also makes bold promises to deliver greater cross-sectoral policy 
 coordination – another challenge that the EU has repeatedly struggled to overcome 
since 1972 (see Chapters 12 and 16).
The second challenge relates to whether the EU has the capacity to fulfil ambitious 
environmental and climate objectives in an era of persistent economic constraint. In 
the early 2000s, European leaders tried to improve the economic competitiveness and 
productivity of the EU as part of a concerted effort to keep pace with the rising eco-
nomic powers of Brazil, India and, most of all, China. After the start of the financial 
crisis in 2008, environmental policy began to be portrayed as an expensive luxury and, 
as noted above, new policy ambitions were significantly scaled back. In the late 2010s, 
the political appetite for policy expansion began to recover, resulting in the European 
Green Deal. But no sooner had this been launched, than the EU succumbed to an-
other economic crisis, related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Initially, the Commission sought to use the pandemic to entrench support for a 
Green Deal-led recovery, underpinned by a massive financial recovery package. 
Signed off by the European Council after marathon talks in July 2020, the package 
supplemented the EU’s normal seven-year spending plan (MFF) with up to euros 750 
billion of borrowed money (dubbed ‘Next Generation EU’) that will be handed out to 
member states in the form of grants and loans. Crucially, at least 30% of the MFF will 
be devoted to spending that supports climate change. The plan is that the Next Gen-
eration EU will be partly paid for via the sale of ETS emission allowances and, possi-
bly, the proceeds from the Carbon Border Adjustment Tax. Nevertheless, it remains 
to be seen whether the political consensus that originally bore the Green Deal and 
COVID-19 recovery packages can be maintained into the future, particularly if job 
losses and costly economic impacts begin to stack up. Or to put it slightly differently, 
will the Green Deal mark a new phase of EU environmental policy making, or the 
continuation of existing dynamics? The answer to this question will become apparent 
as the EU starts to work through the fine detail of implementing both.
Third, there is the ongoing challenge of ensuring that the EU remains democrati-
cally legitimate. No system of governance – let alone a young, multi-levelled one with 
relatively insecure democratic foundations – can possibly hope to endure unless it is 
seen as legitimate by its citizens. As discussed in Chapters 2, 4 and 18, the EU be-
gan life as ‘an elitist project’, supported by an implicit acceptance amongst the public 
that deeper European integration was an inherently good thing. Environmental pol-
icy has benefited greatly from the Monnet Method of integrating ‘by stealth’ (Weale 
et al., 2000: 488). There is mounting evidence to suggest that citizens have become dis-
illusioned with this way of working. After 2000, turn-out at European parliamentary 
elections declined significantly and anti-EU political parties began to emerge. Some 
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argue that the passive consensus in favour of ‘more Europe’ has been replaced by a 
‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2008).
So what is to be done about it? One option is to concentrate on producing more of 
the policy outputs that citizens appear to care about. This is what political theorists 
term ‘output legitimacy’ and it is what EU environmental policy makers have arguably 
spent the past 50 years building up. As noted above and in Chapter 18, Eurobarometer 
polls regularly cite the environment as one of the most popular of all the EU policies. 
However, it is an open question whether output legitimacy is capable of underpinning 
the delivery of something as broad ranging and ambitious as the European Green 
Deal, particularly if it impinges on the daily lives of EU citizens. While a radical shift 
to low-carbon technologies maybe a source of growth and jobs for the Eurozone as a 
whole, it will inevitably cause disruption in areas that are heavily reliant on the pro-
duction of fossil fuels such as coal or vehicles powered by internal combustion engines.
In practice, legitimacy has at least two faces or sides (Scharpf, 1999). Another way 
to enhance the legitimacy of the EU may therefore be to focus more on the input side, 
for example, by involving citizens directly in EU decision making. Hix (2008) is of the 
opinion that the EU could and should do more to legitimise itself by undertaking insti-
tutional reforms which politicise issues that affect the lives of its citizens, and thus draw 
more of them into its orbit. In theory, this idea sounds very appealing. The Treaty of Lis-
bon went some way towards strengthening the input side by empowering the  European 
Parliament and allowing citizens to directly petition the Commission to legislate in new 
areas (the European Citizen Initiative, see Chapter 18). Steps have also been taken to 
make EU activities more open and transparent. However, the chapters of this book have 
revealed that EU is also incredibly complicated; to be fair, a good deal of environmental 
policy making is concerned with very dry technical details. Communicating the com-
plexity but also the importance of EU policy to citizens is hugely challenging. In the 
past, policy complexity tended to favour special interest groups who mobilised in Brus-
sels and Strasbourg to secure selective benefits for their members (Hix, 2005: 407). Com-
plexity also allows politicians to hedge their bets by playing blame games (Chapter 18), 
i.e., claiming the credit for EU policies that deliver, but blaming the EU when things go 
wrong. Environmental lobby groups tend not to engage in such games, but nor do they 
always satisfactorily explain the role or importance of the EU to their supporters (see 
Chapter 9). Consequently, when the EU does environmental things well, many of its 
citizens (and not simply those in the UK) fail to notice.
At present, EU environmental policy is scoring relatively well in terms of output 
legitimacy, but is evidently still finding it difficult to shake off some of the habits of the 
past. Its automatic reflex is, when challenged, to act stealthily to adopt new policies. 
In the Environment Council, for example, a very high percentage of policy dossiers 
are agreed without any open discussion. Even the Parliament – the EU’s only directly 
elected institution – uses informal trilogues to avoid policy dossiers becoming stuck in 
long and drawn-out conciliation negotiations. The role of the plenary is then restricted 
to rubber stamping what has been agreed behind closed doors.
The fourth and final challenge is probably the most existential of all: to decide what 
is to be the main purpose and hence direction of EU integration. From its inception 
in the 1950s, the EU has been an elite political project to repair war-torn Europe. EU 
environmental policy originally emerged as a reaction to the overly economic nature 
of those foundational ideals. After 50 years of more or less continuous development, 
environmental policy makers have managed to establish environmental protection as 
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one of a number of front-ranking objectives of the EU, now formally enshrined in the 
founding treaties and supported by a powerful network of environmental committees, 
ministries and agencies, as well as pressure groups and political parties. Given the 
rather unfavourable starting conditions that pertained in 1972, this must count as a 
significant achievement.
But sterner tests arguably still lie ahead. More and more people have started to 
question the EU’s ultimate purpose, in much the same way as heads of state did in 
Paris 50 years ago. In the late 2010s, an alternative vision – broadly speaking envi-
ronmental sustainability – long promoted by the environmental sector was grasped 
by the Commission, reformulated into a European Green Deal and presented as a 
‘moonshot’ vision for the entire EU to aim for. The Commissioner charged with over-
seeing its implementation, Frans Timmermans, has admitted that it demands nothing 
less than a ‘tectonic shift in the way our society is structured’ (Financial Times, 2020). 
Time will tell whether the EU is capable of rising to such a momentous challenge. One 
thing is clear though: whatever eventually emerges from the EU’s efforts, they will 
have wide-ranging and potentially long-lasting impacts on those who live within and 
well outside its borders.
Summary points
• The EU’s apparent determination to embark on a ‘new growth strategy’ re-
quires it to overcome a number of significant challenges that are well known 
and long running.
• These include employing different types of policy instruments, addressing 
implementation gaps and integrating an environmental dimension in the op-
eration of all policy sectors.
• Sustainable development requires more than the mere adoption of greener 
technologies; delivering a European Green Deal will also challenge the EU’s 
already contested democratic legitimacy to act.
• Regardless of how well the EU performs, its actions will have wide-ranging 
and long-lasting impacts well beyond its borders.
Key questions
1  What are the defining characteristics of EU environmental policy?
2  In what ways is EU environmental policy similar to policies found at the 
national level within and outside the EU?
3  How does the current, COVID-19-dominated phase of environmental policy 
making differ from previous phases?
4  What challenges – big or small – are likely to emerge in the next 50 years or 
so, and how likely are they to be overcome by EU and national-level policy 
makers?
5  Which do you think are likely to be the most difficult challenges, and why?
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